UWBセンサへの隠密攻撃に耐えるUAVのレジリエント経路計画
Resilient Path Planning of UAVs against Covert Attacks on UWB Sensors
GPS偽装と制御入力改ざんを同時に行う隠密攻撃者に対し、UWBセンサで検知されずにUAVの経路を大きく逸脱させる攻撃条件を明らかにし、ポントリャーギンの最大原理に基づく省エネでレジリエントな経路計画を提案した。
著者: Jiayi He, Xin Gong, Yukang Cui, Tingwen Huang
分類: cs.RO
原文アブストラクト
In this letter, a resilient path planning scheme is proposed to navigate a UAV to the planned (nominal) destination with minimum energy-consumption in the presence of a smart attacker. The UAV is equipped with two sensors, a GPS sensor, which is vulnerable to the spoofing attacker, and a well-functioning Ultra-Wideband (UWB) sensor, which is possible to be fooled. We show that a covert attacker can significantly deviate the UAV's path by simultaneously corrupting the GPS signals and forging control inputs without being detected by the UWB sensor. The prerequisite for the attack occurrence is first discussed. Based on this prerequisite, the optimal attack scheme is proposed, which maximizes the deviation between the nominal destination and the real one. Correspondingly, an energy-efficient and resilient navigation scheme based on Pontryagin's maximum principle \cite{gelfand2000calculus} is formulated, which depresses the above covert attacker effectively. To sum up, this problem can be seen as a Stackelberg game \cite{bacsar1998dynamic} between a secure path planner (defender) and a covert attacker. The effectiveness and practicality of our theoretical results are illustrated via two series of simulation examples and a UAV experiment.
