順序ゲーム:優先度付き指標を持つゲームにおける均衡の効率性・存在性・精緻化
Posetal Games: Efficiency, Existence, and Refinement of Equilibria in Games with Prioritized Metrics
各プレイヤーが半順序集合で表された指標に基づいて選好を表現する「順序ゲーム」を提案し、純ナッシュ均衡の存在条件を示すとともに、選好構造への形式的操作によって均衡集合を系統的に絞り込めることを示した。自動運転車の軌道選択ゲームで実証している。
著者: Alessandro Zanardi, Gioele Zardini, Sirish Srinivasan, Saverio Bolognani, Andrea Censi, Florian Dörfler, Emilio Frazzoli
分類: cs.MA, cs.RO, cs.SY, eess.SY
原文アブストラクト
Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a partially ordered set of metrics. This allows one to combine hierarchical priorities of each player with the interactive nature of the environment. By contextualizing standard game theoretical notions, we provide two sufficient conditions on the preference of the players to prove existence of pure Nash Equilibria in finite action sets. Moreover, we define formal operations on the preference structures and link them to a refinement of the game solutions, showing how the set of equilibria can be systematically shrunk. The presented results are showcased in a driving game where autonomous vehicles select from a finite set of trajectories. The results demonstrate the interpretability of results in terms of minimum-rank-violation for each player.
