SilentDrift: アクションチャンキングを悪用したVLAモデルへのステルスバックドア攻撃
SilentDrift: Exploiting Action Chunking for Stealthy Backdoor Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models
VLAモデルのアクションチャンキングとデルタポーズ表現に潜む脆弱性を突き、Smootherstep関数とキーフレーム戦略で検知困難なバックドア攻撃を実現した研究。
詳しい要約
1. どんなもの?
2. 先行研究と比べてどこがすごい?
3. 技術・手法の肝は?
4. どうやって有効だと検証した?
5. 議論はある?
6. 次に読むべき論文は?
※ AIが要旨から生成した要約です。正確性は原文をご確認ください。
著者: Bingxin Xu, Yuzhang Shang, Binghui Wang, Emilio Ferrara
分類: cs.CR, cs.AI, cs.RO
原文アブストラクト
Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are increasingly deployed in safety-critical robotic applications, yet their security vulnerabilities remain underexplored. We identify a fundamental security flaw in modern VLA systems: the combination of action chunking and delta pose representations creates an intra-chunk visual open-loop. This mechanism forces the robot to execute K-step action sequences, allowing per-step perturbations to accumulate through integration. We propose SILENTDRIFT, a stealthy black-box backdoor attack exploiting this vulnerability. Our method employs the Smootherstep function to construct perturbations with guaranteed C2 continuity, ensuring zero velocity and acceleration at trajectory boundaries to satisfy strict kinematic consistency constraints. Furthermore, our keyframe attack strategy selectively poisons only the critical approach phase, maximizing impact while minimizing trigger exposure. The resulting poisoned trajectories are visually indistinguishable from successful demonstrations. Evaluated on the LIBERO, SILENTDRIFT achieves a 93.2% Attack Success Rate with a poisoning rate under 2%, while maintaining a 95.3% Clean Task Success Rate.
