最良応答写像による非対称ナッシュ探索:大域的線形収束と不正確な反応モデルへの頑健性
Asymmetric Nash Seeking via Best Response Maps: Global Linear Convergence and Robustness to Inexact Reaction Models
非対称情報を持つ2プレイヤー制約付きゲームにおいて、一方のプレイヤーが他方の最良応答写像のみを知る状況で、投影勾配降下と最良応答を組み合わせた反復法を提案し、正確な写像での大域的線形収束と、不正確な場合の誤差に応じた近傍への収束を示した。
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著者: Mahdis Rabbani, Navid Mojahed, Shima Nazari
分類: cs.GT, cs.MA, cs.RO, cs.SY, eess.SY, math.OC
原文アブストラクト
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and constraints, an assumption that is often unrealistic in practice. This letter studies a class of asymmetric-information two-player constrained games with decoupled feasible sets, in which Player 1 knows its own objective and constraints while Player 2 is available only through a best-response map. For this class of games, we propose an asymmetric projected gradient descent-best response iteration that does not require full mutual knowledge of both players' optimization problems. Under suitable regularity conditions, we establish the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and prove global linear convergence of the proposed iteration when the best-response map is exact. Recognizing that best-response maps are often learned or estimated, we further analyze the inexact case and show that, when the approximation error is uniformly bounded by $\varepsilon$, the iterates enter an explicit $O(\varepsilon)$ neighborhood of the true Nash equilibrium. Numerical results on a benchmark game corroborate the predicted convergence behavior and error scaling.
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