ロボット学習パイプラインを侵害するためのワールドモデル攻撃
Targeting World Models to Compromise Robot Learning Pipelines
ワールドモデルを介して、一見安全な遠隔操作データに悪意のあるプロンプトや遷移ダイナミクスを埋め込み、危険な合成訓練データを生成してロボットポリシーを侵害する新たなデータポイズニング攻撃手法を提案した。
詳しい要約
1. どんなもの?
2. 先行研究と比べてどこがすごい?
3. 技術・手法の肝は?
4. どうやって有効だと検証した?
5. 議論はある?
6. 次に読むべき論文は?
※ AIが要旨から生成した要約です。正確性は原文をご確認ください。
著者: Ethan Rathbun, Ahmed Agha, Saaduddin Mahmud, Christopher Amato, Alina Oprea, Eugene Bagdasarian
分類: cs.RO, cs.AI, cs.CR
原文アブストラクト
World models have recently seen a rapid growth in both their popularity and capability as more data efficient tools for generating robot training data or simulating real world environments, with many works proposing their integration into the robot learning pipeline. While highly practical, in this work we demonstrate that world models introduce a uniquely stealthy and effective data poisoning entry point into the robot learning supply chain that can result in the deployment of unsafe or otherwise compromised robotic policies despite training on seemingly safe ground truth training data. In contrast to traditional data poisoning techniques which directly implant dangerous trajectories into sold or uploaded datasets, our novel attack methods inject malicious prompts or compromising transition dynamics into visibly safe teleoperated datasets which are only activated once fed through a world model as input. This can result in the generation of synthetic, dangerous robot training trajectories and subsequently unsafe or compromised robot policies. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks against both state of the art action conditioned and text conditioned world models, showing a full end-to-end backdoor on a downstream DRL policy and a proof-of-concept for the VLA setting. Overall these findings necessitate research into more secure world models and reevaluating their position within the robot learning supply chain.
